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Abstract. We devise a multiple (concurrent) commitment scheme operating on large messages. It uses
an ideal global setup functionality in a minimalistic way. The commitment phase is non-interactive. It is
presented in a modular way so that the internal building blocks could easily be replaced by others and/or
isolated during the process of design and implementation. Our optimal instantiation is based on the decisional
Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption and the (adversarially selected group) Diffie-Hellman knowledge (DHK)
assumption which was proposed at CRYPTO 1991. It achieves UC security against static attacks in an
efficient way. Indeed, it is computationally cheaper than Lindell’s highly efficient UC commitment based on
common reference strings and on DDH from EUROCRYPT 2011.
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1 Introduction
A neat way to design a secure cryptographic protocol is to show that, even in adversarial environments,
it emulates a target ideal functionality [25,1,3,21], i.e., a functionality modelling the corresponding
primitive implemented by the protocol. One formalism that resides on this idea is the well-known
framework of Canetti’s, i.e., the universal composability (UC) [9]. This model is compelling because
it comprises a composability proof, i.e., protocols proven secure in the UC-setting are guaranteed to
remain secure if and when composed with themselves and/or other protocols in a parallel or sequential
manner. In order to UC-realize any multiparty computation it suffices to UC-realize the functionality of
(multiple) commitment [11]. Thus, commitments became an essential asset within UC-security.
Communication Models in UC. In the original UC papers [9], it was assumed that the channels
were secure. However, this assumption was consequently [10] dropped; we will henceforth refer to
these two models as the secure-channel UC and the insecure-channel UC, respectively. The latter
means that in the case of honest real-world executions, one can imagine man-in-the-middle adversaries
mounting attacks. To bypass this issue, most UC-secure constructions assume or intrinsically require
authenticated channels. In this paper, we will place some focus onto which protocols of interest achieve
UC-security solely if authenticated channels in the insecure-channel UC model are assumed, and which
do so without this assumption.
Requirements for UC Commitments. It should be clear that it is not straightforward to UC-realize
commitments. Beyond seeking for a protocol that is hiding and binding as in standard lines, we need
the following properties. (A) Ideal adversaries should be able to commit reliably to values that they
(may) ignore at the time at the commit. And, ideal adversaries should be able to open the simulated
commitments to whatever value needed later. (B) The ideal adversary also needs to extract the message
inside any commitment, particularly within those generated by the adversary. Both should be done
without rewinding. Damgård et. al., in [16], refer to the former requirement above as equivocability
and to the latter as extractability. In fact, these requirements were first put forward in [11,17], and [16]
formalized a scheme that would clearly exhibit these constraints (and meet them when properly
implemented). Moreover, such a scheme had already been realized in [2] into a multi-commitment
protocol. Nonetheless, authenticated channels are needed if insecure-channel UC model is assumed.
Unrestricted Communication & UC Commitments. Unfortunately, UC commitment cannot be real-
ized in the standard, non-augmented, UC model. One way to achieve this UC-realization is to use
setups [11,24,2,23,12,24], i.e., to work in the UC-hybrid model where all participants can interact with
an ideal functionality whilst carrying out their part.
Efficiency of UC Commitments & UC Authenticated Channels. At EUROCRYPT 2011, Lindell pro-
posed a highly efficient version of UC commitments, in [24], in the UC common reference string
(CRS)-hybrid model, under the DDH assumption. Lindell’s scheme required approximately 36 ex-
ponentiations for commitment and opening, if security against adaptive corruptions is offered. For
protection against static corruptions only, 26 exponentiations are needed. Very recently, in [5], Blazy et
al. proposed new UC-secure commitment protocols, making the ones by Lindell more efficient. In this
line, they need 22 exponentiations in the static-corruption case and 26 exponentiations, in the adaptive
corruption case.
Both Lindell’s and Blazy’s protocols need the extra assumption of authenticated channels, being
cast in the insecure-channel UC model; this extra assumption is often the case, even if it is not always
clearly stated in the papers. To see this, imagine the following setting. Let a sender S and a receiver
R be both honest. Suppose the environment sends an input x to S, who will play the committer on x.
Let A be a MiM adversary that picks x′. Imagine that A plays a sender session with R, committing on
x′, and a receiver session with S. At the end of the two openings, the honest receiver sends x′ to the
environment. The environment outputs 1 if x = x′. Clearly, this will happen in the above, real-world
execution with a probability 12 , but in the ideal world with probability 1. So, if no authentication is
assumed, then this MiM creates the setting for two distinguishable, real and ideal worlds. The CRS
setup cannot prevent it.
In this line, we propose a solution that bypasses the need for authenticated channels by using
an unforgeable primitive. (Our proofs additionally rest on the soundness of a proof-of-knowledge
employed in our construction). We need fewer exponentiations than in Lindell’s case, and (with
authenticated channels) the same number as in Blazy’s case. But, with our protocol, 10 of the 22
exponentiations only need to be executed once, (even) in the case of multiple commitments. We use a
different setup, yielding more lightweight building blocks, and a non-interactive commitment phase, to
achieve UC-security over insecure channels in the presence of static adversaries.
Isolation as a setup assumption. Damgård et. al. UC-realized multiple commitments [16] by using
a setup assumption that relaxes the tamper-resistant hardware token to a functionality that models
the partial isolation of a party, i.e., the restriction of input and output communication from that party.
Damgård et. al. offer in fact a general construction (rather than an instantiated protocol), relying on the
following fact: if a functionality of isolated parties is available, then witness indistinguishable proofs
of knowledge (WI-PoK) can be realized, which further provide a type of PKI that makes UC multiple
commitment possible. (See [20] for details on PoK.) In this general setting, the UC-realization relies
on the existence of one-way permutations and dense public key, IND-CPA secure cryptosystems with
ciphertexts pseudorandom (which can be considered pretty heavy assumptions). In fact, the functionality
of isolated parties had been used before, in order to realize specifically proofs of knowledge [15].
In [15], the authors motivated the isolation as a remedy to the fact that, in the PoK, the prover could
run a man-in-the-middle attack between a helper and the verifier (resulting in the latter not being sure
that a prover knows the due witness). This setting applies to the UC-insecurity cases as well, where
the simulation fails in the case of simple relay attacks. Overall, we do find the idea behind the work
in [16] convincing indeed, in that computation made in guaranteed isolation may alleviate fundamental
shortcomings in UC simulators.
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In [7], Boureanu et al. introduced atomic exchanges as a UC setup, being a somewhat similar
alternative to the isolated parties of Damgård et. al. The atomic exchange functionality has a different
formulation to Damgård’s isolation primitive. The main differences between the two functionalities can
be summarized as follows. 1. The atomic notion requires isolation of a single message exchange, instead
of an entire protocol session and it is used thus-wise. 2. If a responder R is releasing a response to an
atomic query, then –in between the query and the response– R will have received no incoming messages
from the environment (or from another party). Yet, R can leak as much as he likes to the environment
(or to another party). At the same time, an R isolated à la Damgård et. al. would have both incoming
and outgoing communications blocked. 3. Atomicity implies full isolation on the incoming tape (i.e.,
there is no bit received by an atomically engaged R on its incoming tape). Isolation à la Damgård et. al.
can be partial, i.e., an isolated body can leak a fixed amount of bits. Linked to the requirements needed
from UC commitments, the work in [7] formalizes input-aware equivocal commitment, which is a
primitive given initially outside of the UC framework, encapsulating similar requirements to those
above demanded from UC commitments. The authors also construct a single, bit-commitment protocol
(i.e., not a multi-commitment and not working but on bits) emulating this primitive and then prove that
the protocol is UC-secure if two atomic exchanges are granted and assuming secure channels. In this
line, we will extend the work in [7], to multiple group-element commitments without secure channels
and generalize the methodology therein. We will therefore employ some of the tools introduced in [7].
To meet the requirements (A)–(B), and achieve extraction and (strong) equivocability, the protocols
use to public-private pairs of keys, (pkX ,skX) and (pkE ,skE), respectively. So, we use atomic exchanges
in a minimalistic way to declare/register the public keys once for all. Then, these keys are used in
multiple commitments.
There are cases where isolation in atomic exchanges make practical sense. E.g., by setting up a sharp
time bound for the response and assuming that a responder communicating with a third party would
necessarily produce a timeout [4]. We could use similar techniques as for distance-bounding [8,22].
Isolation is also real when a biometric passport is being scanned inside an isolated reader, or when
a creditcard is being read in an ATM machine. It could also make sense in a voting booth (equipped
with a Faraday cage), in an airplane, in a tunnel, etc. We could imagine hardware-oriented solutions
such as a cell phone (responder) registering a key in a secure booth (sender) preventing external
radio communications. The advantages of atomic exchanges over, e.g., tamper-hardware devices were
discussed in [16].
Our Contribution. Our contribution is five-fold.
1. In this line of work, we further fine-tune restricted local computation, using atomic exchanges [7].
We use these exchanges judiciously.
2. We formalize a design-scheme CLCOM that would achieve commitment in the UC setting. This
is more precise/specified than the one in [11,16]. The blocks within CLCOM are similar to those
in [24], but the decommitment block is less heavy, i.e., ours is a witness indistinguishable proof of
knowledge (PoK) and not a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge3.
3. Linked to the above, we offer a different manner of obtaining extraction and strong equivocability:
it is based on the Diffie-Hellman knowledge (DHK) assumption [14].
4. We advance a protocol UC-realizing FLCOM if a few atomic exchanges are possible at the setup
phase. This protocol enjoys even more efficiency than the one in [24]. It is more concrete and it has
a more judicious use of setups than its counterparts in [16]. We also show how to transform it into
a protocol with other global setups such as a public directory or a CRS.
3 In [16], a witness indistinguishable PoK is used to create a “weak PKI” as part of a different block, i.e., the initializa-
tion/setup block. Our initialization/setup block herein is also more lightweight than the one in [16].
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5. We also bypass the need of assuming authenticated channels (intrinsic to our predecessors [24,5])
by using a signature and a proof of knowledge, whose soundness deters MiM.
Structure. Section 2 introduces the hardness assumptions needed for special instances of our scheme.
Section 3 presents atomic exchanges, i.e., the UC setups used herein. A commitment-scheme is put
forward in Section 4. We then give the necessary requirements for this scheme to UC-realize (multi-
)commitment. Section 5 offers a concrete, efficient protocol that implements the aforementioned
compact scheme and UC-realizes commitment, with atomic exchanges used in a limited way. Section 6
details on the efficiency of our protocol(s) by comparison to existing ones. Appendix A discusses
how to transform our protocol into one based on a global public-key registration with no further ideal
functionality to be used between participants.
2 Hardness Assumptions
Definition 1 (DH Key Generator Gen). A DH key is a tuple K = (G,q,g) such that G is a group,
q is a prime dividing the order of G, g is an element of G of order q. A DH key-generator is a ppt.
algorithm Gen producing DH keys K such that |K|=Poly(logq) and the operations (i.e., multiplication,
comparison, membership checking in the group 〈g〉 generated by g) over their domain can be computed
in time Poly(logq). We say that (S,S′) is a valid K-DH pair for gσ if S ∈ 〈g〉 and S′ = Sσ, where σ ∈ Zq.
An example of a DH key is (Z∗p,q,g) where p,q are primes and p = 2q+1, g ∈ QR(p), g 6= 1.
In the descriptions below, we use an arbitrary ppt. algorithm B generating some coins ρ and states
state. Such ρ and state will be used as auxiliary inputs to some other algorithms in the security games
formalized below.
Definition 2 (ag-DDHGen). The ag-DDHGen assumption relative to a DH key generator Gen states
that for any polynomially bounded algorithms A and B in the next game, the probability that b = b is
1
2 but something negligible, i.e., Pr[b = b]− 12 is negligible:
1: (ρ,state) := B(1λ;rB)
2: K := Gen(1λ;ρ), (G,q,g) = K
3: pick α,β,γ ∈U Zq
4: A := gα; B := gβ; C0 := gγ; C1 := gαβ
5: pick b ∈U {0,1}
6: b := A(1λ,state,A,B,Cb;r)
The probability stands over the random coins rB , r, b ∈U {0,1} and α,β,γ ∈U Zq. The probability is
negligible in terms of logq. The algorithms A and B are ppt. in terms of logq.
In the above definition, “ag” stands for “adversarially-chosen group”. This is a weaker assumption than
the usual DDH assumption [19] (which is supposed to be hard for all generated groups).
We adopt the strengthening from [7] of the Diffie-Hellman knowledge (DHK0) assumption [14]
(for a summary of the latter, refer to [19]).
Definition 3 (ag-DHK0Gen). The ag-DHK0Gen assumption relative to a DH key generator Gen states
that for any polynomially bounded algorithms A and B , there must exist a polynomially bounded algo-
rithmE such that the following experiment yields 1 with negligible probability:
1: (ρ,state) := B(1λ;rB)
2: K := Gen(1λ;ρ), (G,q,g) = K
3: pick σ ∈U Zq
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4: (S,S′) := A(1λ,state,gσ;r)
5: if (S,S′) is not a valid K-DH pair for gσ, then return 0
6: s := E(1λ,state,gσ,r)
7: if S = gs, then return 0
8: return 1
The probability stands over the random coins rB , r and σ ∈U Zq. The probability is negligible in terms
of logq. The algorithms E and B are ppt. in terms of logq.
This assumption means that whatever the algorithm producing valid DH pairs (S,S′) for a random gσ
with σ unknown, this algorithm must know the discrete logarithm s of their components except for
some negligible cases.
What distinguishes these assumptions from the mainstream DDH and DHK0 assumptions [19]
is that these should hold for all K selected by a B algorithm (even by a malicious one) and not only
for some K which is selected by an honest participant. In fact, when it comes to selecting a DH key
without a CRS in a two party protocol, the above assumption must hold for any maliciously selected
K (since we ignore a priori which party is honest). Hence, the name we use: DH assumptions in an
adversarially-chosen group. The latter assumption is a special case of the DH knowledge assumption
required to hold in any group, introduced by Dent in [19]. Here, we do not require the assumption to
hold in any group but rather in those groups G for which we can produce a seed for Gen.
In the next, for readability purposes, we will often omit the additional-input 1λ from the inputs of
the machines that require it, its presence being implicit.
3 UC Functionalities
3.1 The Atomic Setup Functionality
We start with the setup functionality we are going to use in our construction. This functionality is
denoted Fatomic. Let poly be a polynomial. The Fatomic ideal functionality involves some participants
called Caller (C) and Responder (R). It works as follows (upon receipt of the messages below).
Ready(C,R,M) message from R. In this message, M denotes the description of the Turing machine
run by R and the functionality parses the message, stores (C,R,M), and sends the message Ready(C)
to the ideal adversary. Any other tuple starting with (C,R) is erased.4
Note that –by the above– R can resend this command to Fatomic, possibly with a different M.
Cancel(C) message from R. This counts for an abortion from the atomic session. So, the functionality
sends the message Cancelled(C) to the ideal adversary and any tuple starting with (C,R) is erased.
Atomic(R,c) message from C. The functionality verifies the existence of a tuple for the pair (C,R).
If there is none, is aborts. Let (C,R,M) be the found tuple. The functionality runs r = M(c) for
no more than poly(|c|) steps, then sends (response,C,R,r) to C and the ideal adversary, and
(challenge-issued,C,R,c) to R and the ideal adversary. Finally, the tuple is erased.
Our objective is to employ Fatomic as little as possible. It is actually required only to set up public
keys. So, we will use it in a key-setup/key-registration block, which is executed between each pair
of participants who want to run a commitment protocol. This kind of block is bound to require a
setup functionality. We could, for instance, rely instead on trusted third parties to whom we could
register keys and obtain the public key of participants in a reliable way. In what immediately follows
we describe the 2-party approach, without such PKI. However, a version based on a public directory is
discussed in Appendix A.2.
4 We note that the Turing machine M is deterministic (or an equivalent one, a probabilistic one but with the necessary
random coins hard-coded within).
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3.2 The Commitment Functionality
We now continue with the functionality of commitment we would like to UC-realize. The (unusual)
Init step denotes a part in which the parties involved register some data (e.g., public-private keys) that
would be used in the remainder of the run of the protocol to carry out the final task.
The FLCOM ideal functionality works as follows (upon receipt of the messages below). It involves
some participants called Sender (S) and Receiver (R).
Init(R) message from S. If R and S are already defined, abort. Otherwise, define (store) R and S, send
an [initialized,R,S] message to R and to the ideal adversary.
Commit(sid,m) message. If this does not come from S, or S is undefined, or sid is not fresh, abort.
Otherwise, store (sid,m,sealed) and send a [committed,sid] message to R and to the ideal adver-
sary.
Open(sid) message. If this does not come from S, or S is undefined, or sid is new, abort. Otherwise,
retrieve (sid,m,state). If state 6= sealed, abort. Otherwise, send an [open,sid,m] message to R and
to the ideal adversary5, and replace state by opened in the (sid,m,state) entry.
We note that the above functionality is cast in the insecure-channel UC model. This is in the sense
that the delayed outputs (i.e., having the functionality send the opening messages to the ideal adversary
as well) would not be needed in the secure channels UC. However, they are needed in the insecure
channel UC, since without them the ideal simulator would have problems simulating a real execution
in which both parties are honest6. Unfortunately, in some cases [15,16] where insecure-channel UC
is the underlying model, this delayed output is omitted (which would mean that the simulation of the
honest, real-world case is impossible). However, in these very case, it can easily be fixed, because their
settings rely on a step of a key-registration, and –in itself– this offers the means for authentication.
We will eventually UC-realize this functionality. However, we can easily (with a slightly more
computationally expensive protocol) cast everything in terms of the standard multi-commitment
functionality FMCOM (see Appendix A.2); the latter functionality can be seen, for instance, in [11].
Unlike FMCOM where there is no inner init-phase included and participants/roles are defined upon
Commit, FLCOM allows multiple commitments from the same sender S to the same receiver R decided
at its inner init-phase. In other words, FLCOM allows multiple commitments at a link level, i.e., LCOM.
So, to UC-realize FMCOM with FLCOM, we just need to integrate the LCOM Init phase in every Commit
with a new S-R link.
4 Compact UC Commitments
4.1 A Compact Scheme for FLCOM
In Figure 1, we show a design of a UC commitment scheme based on several building blocks linked
together.
These blocks are as follows: a parameter-generation procedure KeyGen yielding the secret-public
key pairs (skE ,pkE) and (skX ,pkX); a Register block emulating key-registration; an unforgeable
scheme CommpkX which is a commitment in standard lines extractable under skX ; an interactive
proof either of the message inside the commitment or of the knowledge of the secret key skE . Note
5 Sending to the ideal adversary is necessary for the simulation in the insecure-channel UC model because commitment
protocols send the committed message in clear during opening and the ideal adversary must simulate such protocol when
both participants are honest, although he cannot get the message by any other mean.
6 It is often the case that, in the real-world execution, the committed input is eventually sent in clear, as part of the opening
phase. To get a correct ideal world simulation, this delayed output from the ideal functionality is needed.
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that auth(· · ·) is a shorthand to stress that the input are messages to be protected, either by some
authenticated channel, or by means of a digital signature, with a key registered like for skX . All these
will be explained formally in the sequel and an instantiation of each will be given (if not before, then in
Section 5). We will show that, under the right assumptions, these methods can be implemented in a
manner that is neither too expensive, nor does it involve many (atomic) exchanges.
Informal Explanations about the Scheme. Before everything, the participants generate their public and
secret keys, e.g., pkX and skX for S. Note that we do not assume a CRS to retrieve them from and –in
general– we do not suppose necessarily the same domain for the keys of S and those of R.
Then, the sender essentially registers his public key pkX to the receiver (while storing the associated
secret key skX for himself). The receiver does the same for (pkE ,skE), respectively. Further, based on
some mechanism and on the setup functionality, each demonstrates7 to the other that they hold the
corresponding secret-key counterparts. To achieve this phase, we use the Register block. This phase,
involving key generation (i.e., KeyGen) and key registration (i.e., Register), is called the key-setup.
Sender S Receiver R
initialization phase
input: R input: S
pick skX , pkX := KeyGen(skX )
S−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ if S incorrect, abort
Register(pkX ,skX )←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Register(pkE ,skE )←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ pick skE , pkE := KeyGen(skE)
commitment phase
input: R,sid,m input: S,sid
if Init(R) not done abort if Init not done with S, abort
if Commit(sid, . . .) already run, abort if Commit(sid) already run, abort
pick r, W := CommpkX (m;r)
auth(pkX ,sid,S,W )−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ if S or sid incorrect, abort
opening phase
input: sid input: sid
if Commit(sid, . . .) not done, abort if Commit(sid, . . .) not done, abort
if Open(sid) already run, abort if Open(sid) already run, abort
m¯ := m m¯−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
PoK{(r,skE ):(W=CommpkX (m¯;r)) ∨ (pkE=KeyGen(skE ))}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
output: m¯
Fig. 1. A Compact Commitment-Scheme CLCOM with Atomic Exchanges
Assume that the sender would like to commit to a message m. Assume that the message is embedded
into some suitable domain (e.g., a domain where mathematical operations can be easily applied). The
commitment phase proceeds as follows. Using his public key pkX and some random coins r, the
sender produces W as the commitment to m using the block Comm. This block is an unforgeable
commitment in itself. If it were not unforgeable, we would need to assume authenticated channels
(like our predecessors [24,5]), so that a MiM were not able to perturb the honest transactions. I.e.,
W = CommX(m;r) should be bind S to m and hide m from R. But, to anticipate, if, e.g., an ideal
adversary were able to know skX for S he could run ExtractskX (CommpkX (m;r)) to obtain m. This
would ensure extractability or requirement (B) on page 1.
An essential block of the opening phase of this scheme is a proof of knowledge, denoted PoK. After
sending m, the sender practically uses this block to prove that either m is equal to m and r has been used
in producing the commitment, or that he knows skE ; as only R should know skE , this convinces R of
7 No WI-PoK, as in [16], will be used in this the implementation of this assertion.
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the binding character of the commitment. But, obviously, for someone that knows skE this commitment
becomes equivocal.
Then, for the ideal world to be indistinguishable from the real world, intuitively we need to make
sure that the implementation of the blocks are such that their outputs look the same under some coins
and an adaptively chosen respective counterpart of those. In the next sections, we will see a way in
which this can be achieved.
Note that in order to realize FLCOM, it is important that the sk and pk keys are fresh for every new
pair (S,R) of participants and that Register is run only once for each key.8
We proceed with the formalization of these blocks.
4.2 Key Setup Block
We begin by the block of key-setup which includes key generation and key registration. Intuitively,
KeyGen computes a public key pk out of a secret key sk. Then, the Register protocol is used for a
prover to demonstrate that he holds sk to a verifier who has received pk from this prover. We are going
to formalize the semantics of these blocks.
Definition 4 (The KeyGen and Register Blocks). Let λ be a security parameter. The KeyGen block is
a function from a domain Dsk to a domain Dpk (depending on λ). The Register block is a ppt. protocol
involving a prover P, a verifier V , and an ideal functionality F . The value sk is the input for P (which
is denoted P(sk)). The value pk= KeyGen(1λ,sk) is the output of V (unless the protocol aborts).
There must exist a polynomial time algorithm E such that for all ppt. adversaryA and ppt. algorithm
B , in an experiment with V , A , and B having access to F and V only interacting with A , we have that
KeyGen(1λ,E(v)) = pk, except with negligible probability, where v denotes the view of A and pk is
the output of V .
For every ppt. algorithm V ∗ interacting with P(sk), with sk random, the following happens with
negligible probability: V ∗ outputs s, KeyGen(1λ,s) = KeyGen(1λ,sk), and P will have not aborted.
We say that Register is authenticating if there is no man-in-the-middle attack such that a honest
verifier ends up with some pk such that pk 6= KeyGen(1λ,sk), where sk is the input of the honest prover.
This non-extractability property is cheaper than zero-knowledge. Note that it implies that KeyGen
must be a one-way function.9 In other words, over a domain Dpk×Dsk generated as per KeyGen it is
computationally hard to retrieve the secret key sk ∈Dsk, given the public key pk ∈Dpk. In practice, the
idea of such a non-extractability of the secret key sk out of the public data pk can rely on the hardness
of some computational assumption.
Example 5. We now offer an example of this sort of key-setup. This example is part of the C-at
protocol on Fig. 4, page 16. A key-pair (pk,sk), with pk generated by such an algorithm KeyGen
can be given by ((ρ,gx),(ρ,x)), i.e., pk = (ρ,gx), sk = (ρ,x), with ρ being some coins to generate
(G,q,g) =Gen(ρ), and where G is a group, q is a prime dividing the order of G, g is an element of G of
order q, and x ∈U Zq. One cannot obtain this sk out of this pk unless they break the DLGen assumption
(see Section 2).
We can define Register as follows (see Fig. 2): given sk= (ρ,x) and pk= (ρ,X), P sends ρ to V , V
computes (G,q,g) = Gen(ρ), picks α ∈U Zq, sends an atomic10 X0 = gα to P. Then, P checks X0 ∈ G
8 In the C-at protocol to be defined (see Fig. 4), a Register block could be maliciously used as a z 7→ zsk oracle, allowing an
adversary either to extract or to equivocate a commitment.
9 One-wayness here means for any ppt. algorithm A the following probability is negligible in λ:
PrrA ,sk[Gen(1
λ,A(1λ,pk;rA )) = pk |pk= Gen(1λ,sk)].
10 V sending an atomic X0 is a syntactic-sugar meaning that P sends a prior Ready(V,M) to Fatomic where M is an algorithm
to compute M(X0) = (X ,X ′), then V sends Atomic(P,X0) to Fatomic. (See [7].)
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and sends back X and X ′ = Xx0 to V . The latter finally checks that X
′ = Xα. Finally, V sends α to P for
checking that X0 = gα.
Prover Verifier
input: ρ,x
(G,q,g) := Gen(ρ)
ρ−−−−−−−−−−−→ (G,q,g) := Gen(ρ)
X0
?∈ G atomic: X0←−−−−−−−−−−− α ∈U Zq, X0 := gα
X := gx, X ′ := Xx0
X ,X ′−−−−−−−−−−−→ X ′ ?= Xα
X0
?
= gα α←−−−−−−−−−−−
output: ρ,X
Fig. 2. A Register Protocol
Lemma 6. Under the ag-DHK0Gen and DLGen assumptions, the protocol in Example 5 based on
Fatomic is a Register block with KeyGen. It is further authenticating.
The idea of this protocol is that by preparing the atomic response, the prover provides an algorithm
from which we can extract X based on the DHK0 assumption.
Proof. Based on the ag-DHK0Gen assumption, the atomic response clearly leaks x. So, P’s view can
provide sk and the first requirement is satisfied.
Furthermore, based on the DLGen assumption, the protocol does not leak sk to V ∗. This comes from
that we could run V ∗ with a genuine ρ from the DLGen game, then continue with some dummy X¯ = gx¯
and X¯ ′ = X x¯0 to get α (otherwise, P aborts). Then, he rewind to when X and X
′ are submitted to V ∗. He
gets a genuine X from the DLGen game and sets X ′ = Xα. Clearly, this experiment cannot extract x
under the DLGen assumption.
The authentication comes from that the atomic functionality authenticates X to the verifier. uunionsq
We could also have a Register block based on a global CRS (à la [24]). The prover simply sends
σ= Enccrs(sk) and PoK{sk : σ= Enccrs(sk)∧pk= KeyGen(sk)}.
4.3 The Extractable Commitment Block
We mention the requirements needed from the Comm block (and the Extract block) in the CLCOM
scheme; consider the notations therein.
Definition 7 (Extractable Commitment). An extractable commitment for the KeyGen and Register
blocks is defined by a set of algorithms Comm and Extract such that for all skX ∈ Dsk, m, and r, if
pkX = KeyGen(1λ,skX), then ExtractskX (CommpkX (m;r)) = m.
Further, we require that an extractable commitment is computationally hiding with the Register
block. I.e., any ppt. algorithm A has a probability of winning the following game which is negligibly
close to 12 :
1: pick skX ∈U Dsk and set pkX := KeyGen(1λ,skX)
2: run the Register block with A playing the role of the verifier
3: A selects two messages m0 and m1
4: flip a coin b, compute W = CommpkX (mb;r), and run A on W
5: A outputs b′ and wins if b′ = b
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A may use the functionality F coming from Register as per Def. 4.
The reason why we introduced Register in the hiding notion is because we do not necessarily assume
any zero-knowledge property on Register. So, some information may leak, but we want that it does not
help to uncover the committed message.
4.4 The Equivocable Opening Block
Definition 8 (PoK Block). Given the blocks KeyGen and Comm and an instance described by
(W,pkE) of an initialization and commitment phase, the PoK block is a witness indistinguishable proof
of knowledge11 from S to R for either r or skE such that W = CommpkX (m;r) or pkE = KeyGen(skE).
By proof of knowledge, we mean that the protocol is polynomially bounded, complete, and that there is
an extractor who can compute a witness out of the view of a successful malicious prover. By witness
indistinguishable (WI), we mean that the honest prover can use either r or skE as a witness to run
his algorithm, and that the respective cases cannot be distinguished by a malicious verifier. (Again,
see [20] for details on WI-PoK and PoK.) More concretely, and ppt. algorithm A has a probability of
winning negligibly close to 12 in the following game:
1: A selects an instance inst and two possible witnesses w0 and w1 for PoK
2: flip a coin b and set wit= wb
3: run PoK with a prover for inst using wit as a witness and with A playing the role of the verifier
4: A outputs b′ and wins if b′ = b
A may use the functionality F coming from Register as per Def. 4.
4.5 UC Security of the Compact Scheme
Theorem 9. Under the assumptions of Def. 4 (using a functionality F ), Def. 7, and Def. 8, in presence
of a static adversary, the compact-scheme CLCOM UC-realizes the FLCOM ideal functionality using F
as a global setup.12
In the insecure-channel UC model with authentication, the result holds when auth(· · ·) is just trans-
mitting messages through the authenticated channel. In the insecure-channel UC model without
authentication, the sender must register an additional (authenticated) key and auth simply appends a
digital signature based on this key. So, we move the auth requirement to the initialization phase. If the
Register block is authenticating, this is solved.
Proof (sketch). Let S (sender) and R (receiver) be two participants running one initialization Sinit/Rinit
and multiple commitments Scommit/Rcommit and Sopen/Ropen, upon activation by the environment. Note
that S and R are paired by the unique FLCOM initialization.13 In the ideal world, they run, if honest,
the dummy_S or dummy_R algorithms forwarding inputs/outputs between the environment and FLCOM.
Otherwise, they behave as instructed by the ideal adversary I . While the ideal-world experiment is
running, I runs an internal simulation of the real world experiment to make the interaction with the
environment indistinguishable. So, I runs a simulation of the adversary A , of the honest participants
S or R supposed to run their specific algorithms, and of the setup functionality F (in due turns).
11 See [20] for details on witness indistinguishable proofs of knowledge (WI-PoK).
12 By global setup, we mean that the environment can access to it as well. This is also called GUC in the literature.
13 So, proving GUC reduces to proving EUC: in a multiparty setting, the participant calling FLCOM with the identifier of
another participant defines S and R. All other participants can be glued into the environment.
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He corrupts correspondingly to the real world the dummy S or R who then behave following the A
simulation.
In what follows, we describe, depending on the corruption state, how the simulation of the honest
participants is done. Our simulator will be straight-line, but proving (and only proving) that the
simulation is indistinguishable may require rewinding, as allowed in the UC model.
Case where S and R are corrupted. There is no honest participant to simulate: A defines the behavior
of S and R and the simulation is perfect. Actually, there is no interaction with FLCOM in this case.
Case where S is honest. R may be corrupted or not. If R is honest, its simulation is based on the normal
algorithms Rinit, Rcommit, and Ropen. Clearly, this simulation of R to A is perfect.
During initialization, the simulation of S is straightforward as it requires no communication with
the environment: he runs the same algorithms Sinit as in the real world. This simulation is perfect.
We note that while the honest S is simulated, even though R may be honest as well, his messages
may be modified by A . In any case, we consider the honest S interacting with some T where T is the
complement of the simulation of S in I . I.e., it includes the simulation of A and the one of R, no matter
whether R is honest or not. Let skX be the secret key selected by the simulator of the honest S. Let
pkE be the public key registered to S. Based on the property of the Register block, I can extract skE
corresponding to pkE based on the view of T . (In Def. 4, T plays the role of A while the environment,
the dummy honest participants, and FLCOM play the role of B .)
During commitment, I simulates S running Scommit on some random message m.
During the opening, FLCOM tells I the value of m¯ committed by the dummy S. Then, I simulates S
equivocating the commitment to m¯ by using skE in the m 6= m¯ case: I makes S send m¯ and run the PoK
protocol with skE as a witness. In the m = m¯ case, I simulates S normally: using Sopen.
Indistinguishability. In general, to prove indistinguishability, we have to prove that all messages sent to
the environment are indistinguishable in both worlds. There are two types of messages: the output from
the dummy (honest) participants (in our case, there is only dummy_R, if honest, and during opening,
which has content), and the messages from the corrupted ones, i.e., from A . This reduces to proving
that dummy_R, if honest, opens to a correct message, and that the simulation of honest participants is
indistinguishable by A in both worlds.
Let us consider the honest R case. Clearly, dummy_R sends the outcome m¯ to the environment,
and it matches the input to dummy_S. In the real world, even though the adversary may corrupt the
communication, we prove that R ending the opening on m¯ while S began the commitment with a
different message happens with negligible probability. For that, we assume that these messages are
different. Thanks to the Register block and auth message, both S and R use the same pkE and W . Since
PoK is a sound proof of knowledge, from the prover (i.e., the entire experiment except the simulation
for R), we extract a witness, possibly by rewinding. Since the commitment does not open to m¯, this
witness must be a secret key related to pkE . Now, since skE is only used in Register, this shows that we
can extract a preimage of KeyGen(skE) from the Register protocol. But this is excluded by Def. 4. So,
the outcome m¯ from a honest dummy_R matches the one of the real world experiment.
Then, we have to prove that the simulation of the interaction between S and R (when honest) makes
the simulation of A behave in an indistinguishable way to the adversary in the real world. The case of a
honest R is clear: the simulation in the ideal world behaves exactly like in the real world. As for S, the
result is clear for m = m¯ as they run exactly the same algorithms. It remains to consider the simulation
of S in the m 6= m¯ case.
Let Γ0 be the ideal world experiment producing the output of the environment, in the m 6= m¯ case.
We note that skX is only used by Register during the initialization. So, we can use the hiding property
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of Comm to say that Γ0 is indistinguishable to the game Γ1 in which we run Scommit(R,sid, m¯) for S
instead of Scommit(R,sid,m). Just as in Γ0, this game Γ1 is still using skE as a witness to run PoK. Due
to the witness indistinguishable property, Γ1 is indistinguishable to the game Γ2 in which S uses r as a
witness instead. This final game Γ2 corresponds to the real world experiment. So, the real and ideal
world experiments produce indistinguishable outcomes.
Case where S (but not R) is corrupted. During initialization, R is simulated by running the normal
algorithm Rinit interacting with A and F . So, thanks to the property of the Register block I can extract
skX based on his own view.
The simulation for the commitment phase starts normally by running the normal algorithm for R.
After W is released, I computes ExtractskX (W ) to deduce the committed value m by A . If extraction
fails, m is set to a random message. Then, the ideal adversary I makes the corrupted dummy_S send a
Commit(sid,m) message to FLCOM.
The simulation for the opening phase starts normally with R running the normal algorithm Ropen.
If Ropen aborts, I aborts. If it succeeds and Ropen outputs something, then the ideal adversary I makes
dummy_S send an Open(sid) message to FLCOM.
Indistinguishability. Since R follows his algorithms, the simulation of the interaction (to A) is perfect.
We only have to prove that the outcome of dummy_R (which will be sent to the environment) matches
the one by R. We observe that, due to the extractability of the commitment, it is perfectly binding.
So, if R in the real world ends up with the opened commitment m¯ and that ExtractskX (W ) 6= m¯, due
to PoK being sound, we could extract (possibly by rewinding) a valid witness skE . Since R is honest
and only uses skE for Register, the properties of Register make it impossible. So, this proves that
ExtractskX (W ) 6= m¯ with negligible probability. So, we have m¯ = m in the real world, which is also
guaranteed by the simulation. uunionsq
5 Instantiated Compact Scheme
Given a group K = Gen(1λ,ρ), we define an injective function map from the set of possible values to
commit to the group K. The function map, as well as its inverse, must be easy to compute. For instance,
if 〈g〉 is the group of quadratic residues in Z∗p and p = 2q+1 is a strong prime, we can set the message
space to {1, . . . ,N} for N < q and define map(m) = (±m) mod p, specifically the only one of the two
values which is a quadratic residue.
In Figure 4, on page 16, we present a protocol that implements the schema in Figure 1. Then, we
prove that this protocol is UC-secure with atomic as a setup, and under certain assumptions.
The KeyGen and Register blocks are as in Example 5. Based on pkX = (ρ,X) and skX = (ρ,x),
for r ∈ Zq, we have CommpkX (m;r) = (U,V ) with U = gr and V =map(m)X r. This is the ElGamal
encryption. We let ExtractskX (U,V ) =map
−1(VU−x).
Lemma 10. Under the ag-DDHGen assumption, the above Comm and Extract algorithms define an
extractable commitment in the sense of Def. 7, for KeyGen and Register from Example 5.
Proof. To show that Comm is hiding, we consider the game in Def. 7: the adversary A receives ρ
defining a group with a generator g, then sends some random X0 in the group, receives X ,X ′, sends
α such that X0 = gα (otherwise, fail), sends some m0 and m1, receives (U,V ) which is the ElGamal
encryption of map(mb) with key X , for some random b, and produces a bit b′. He wins if b = b′.
First, we play with A by submitting some X¯ = gx¯ for some random x¯, with X¯ ′ = X x¯0 . Then we can
get α and rewind, by submitting some external X and X ′ = Xα. This reduces to the semantic security
of the ElGamal encryption. We then use the standard result [6] that ElGamal encryption is IND-CPA
secure under the DDHGen assumption. uunionsq
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By using the standard construction [13] based on proofs of disjunctive statements [13,18], we
construct a PoK for our instances. The protocol is depicted on Figure 4 in which the prover uses r as a
witness. To use skE = y as a witness (for equivocation), the computations of the prover are replaced by
b ∈U Z∗q2 , c1 ∈U {0,1, . . . ,2n−1}, s1 ∈U Z∗q1
t1 :=Uc1g
s1
1 , t2 = (
V
map(m¯))
c1X s1 , t3 := Y b
c2 := c⊕ c1, s2 := (b− c2y) mod q2
We have the following result.
Lemma 11. The 3-move protocol with the t, c, and s messages (in the opening phase) in Figure 4
defines a Σ-protocol for {(r,skE) : ((U,V ) = CommpkX (m;r)) ∨ (pkE = KeyGen(skE))}. It is a PoK
block in the sense of Def. 8, for KeyGen and Comm from above.
Theorem 9 and Lemma 6–11 wrap up into the following result.
Theorem 12. Under the ag-DHK0Gen and ag-DDHGen assumptions, the C-at protocol on Figure 4
UC-realizes FLCOM in the Fatomic-hybrid model considered, under a static adversary.
In Appendix A, we discuss on possible extensions. I.e., relaxing the ag-DHK0Gen assumption,
implementing the atomic exchanges, and making a PKI for multiple commitment.
6 Efficiency
To compare the efficiency of protocols, we count the number of exponentiations. There are some which
must be done during the setup and which could be used for several commitments. There are some using
small exponents (such as c1 or c2) which are faster than others. If we are not satisfied by the DHK0
assumption, we can use the ZK proof based on the DDH assumption as per Appendix A.1 (and if Hκ is
say implemented via Pedersen commitment [27]). We compare the protocols of [24] and [5] with ours
below.
protocol setup fast regular
Lindell [24] 6 20
Blazy et al. [5] 2 20
our protocol with DHK0 10 4 8
our protocol with DDH 16 4 8
For 2-party protocols requiring many commitments, out protocol is thus at least twice faster than others.
The reduction in the number of exponentiations resides mainly on our use of the ag-DHK0Gen
assumption. As aforementioned, it may be possible to select adversarial groups where the ag-DHK0Gen
assumption may hold and then efficiently work in these groups. An example of this was given in
Example 5. Also, to this end, the atomic exchanges are very limited within (and see Appendix A.2 for
possible, efficient implementations through, e.g., distance-bounding [22]).
To achieve security, the previous protocols in [24,5] assumed authenticated channels, on top of the
insecure-channel UC model. We can relax this assumption by using a signature, at the cost of a few
more exponentiations. (E.g., 3 more regular ones for signature and verification, and 5 more during
setup for registering verification key.)
All in all, in general, we yield a generally more efficient, very modular UC commitment protocol.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper, we devised a design-scheme for multiple (concurrent) commitment-scheme operating
on large messages. It uses the ideal setup functionality of atomic messages in a minimalistic way.
We suggest how this functionality can be achieved in practice, and we claim that it is indeed lighter
than other UC setups for commitments. Our scheme enjoys UC security under static attacks. It is
presented in a modular way so that the internal building blocks could easily be replaced by others
and/or isolated during the process of design and implementation. Our optimal proposed instantiation is
based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption and the adversarially selected group Diffie-Hellman
knowledge assumption. This outperforms other efficient UC commitments [24] based on CRS and
DDH. At the same time, it can be viewed as an alternative to the new protocol in [5], bypassing the
need for authenticated channels, but keeping in place the same number of exponentiations with a
more modular construction. However, our protocol can enjoy UC security without needing to assume
authentication on top of the UC insecure channels, unlike [5,24]. If the adversarially selected group
Diffie-Hellman knowledge assumption is dropped, another instantiation of ours performs still slightly
better than existent efficient UC commitments.
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A Extensions
A.1 A Variant Based on ag-DDHGen
We can drop the ag-DHK0Gen assumption and solely rely on the ag-DDHGen one. For that, we construct
a new Register protocol based on a zero-knowledge proof with the Schnorr Σ-protocol. See Figure 3
on page 15. This would get us closer to [16], where a WI-PoK is used in the key-setup block.
Namely, we enrich the Σ-protocol with a trapdoor commitment Hgen on the challenge c, with the
trapdoor σ released at the end. It is a trapdoor in the sense that for all γ and all c′, Equivσ(γ,c′) has the
same distribution as u and Hκ(c′,Equivσ(γ,c′)) = γ. This is quite a standard technique [26]. By making
the challenge atomic, we obtain a ZK protocol in a regular sense. It is further straightforward to see that
Register satisfies all requirements, based on the ag-DDHGen assumption. To make it authenticating, we
can take advantage of the Fatomic exchange to authenticate X at the same time as the response is sent.
Prover Verifier
input: ρ,x
(G,q,g) := Gen(ρ)
X := gx, pick σ pick c, u
κ := Hgen(σ)
ρ,X ,κ−−−−−−−−−−−→ (G,q,g) := Gen(ρ)
a ∈U Zq γ←−−−−−−−−−−− γ := Hκ(c,u)
t := ga t−−−−−−−−−−−→
γ ?= Hκ(c,u)
atomic: c,u←−−−−−−−−−−−
s := a− cx mod q s,σ−−−−−−−−−−−→ κ ?= Hgen(σ)
gsXc ?= t
output: ρ,X
Fig. 3. A ZK Variant for the Register Protocol
In general we prefer to use the ag-DHK0Gen to ascertain the private knowledge of sk. This may
be more efficient in practice than a full implementation of, e.g., a WI-PoK. It essentially requires the
selection of appropriate (and efficient) groups to work in, as done in Example 5.
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A.2 Towards FMCOM
The FMCOM functionality is defined as follows:
Commit(sid,R,m) message from S. If sid is not fresh, abort. Otherwise, store (sid,S,R,m,sealed) and
send a [committed,sid,S] message to R and to the ideal adversary.
Open(sid) message from S. If sid is new or the record (sid,S, ., ., .) has no matching S, abort. Other-
wise, retrieve (sid,S,R,m,state). If state 6= sealed, abort. Otherwise, send an [open,sid,m]message
to R and to the ideal adversary, and replace state by opened in the (sid,S,R,m,state) entry.
To realize this functionality, we use a similar assumption as in [16]: we assume that a participant
plays the role of a trusted certificate authority (who is honest but curious), to whom participants register
their keys skX and skE . The first time a participant is involved in a commitment, he must register his
keys to the certificate authority (CA) and get the CA’s public key at the same time. The CA would
produce a certificate which could be verified with the CA’s public key. Then, the Init phase between
S and R would reduce to sending and verifying this certificate, without any ideal functionality. Due
to the extraction nature of our Register block, all secret keys would become extractable by the ideal
adversary and the UC security would still hold.
Sender S Receiver R
initialization phase
input: R input: S
S−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ if S incorrect, abort
pick ρ1, (G1,g1,q1) := Gen(1λ,ρ1)
ρ1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (G1,g1,q1) := Gen(1λ,ρ1)
X0
?∈ 〈g1〉 atomic: X0←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− α ∈U Z∗q1 , X0 := gα1
x ∈U Z∗q1 , X := gx1, X ′ := Xx0
X ,X ′−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ X ?∈ 〈g1〉, X ′ ?= Xα
X0
?
= gα1
α←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
(G2,g2,q2) := Gen(1λ,ρ1)
ρ2←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− pick ρ2, (G2,g2,q2) := Gen(1λ,ρ2)
β ∈U Z∗q2 , Y0 := g
β
2
atomic: Y0−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Y0
?∈ 〈g2〉
Y
?∈ 〈g2〉, Y ′ ?= Yβ Y,Y
′
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− y ∈U Z∗q2 , Y := g
y
2, Y
′ := Y y0
β−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Y0 ?= gβ2
commitment phase
input: R,sid,m input: S,sid
if Init(R) not done, abort if Init not done with S, abort
if Commit(sid, .) already run, abort if Commit(sid) already run, abort
r ∈U Zq1 , U := gr1, V :=map(m)X r
auth(pkX ,sid,S,U,V )−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ if S or sid incorrect, abort
U,V
?∈ 〈g1〉
opening phase
input: sid input: sid
if Commit(sid, .) not done, abort
if Open(sid) already run, abort
m¯ := m m¯−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ if Commit(sid) not done, abort
a ∈U Z∗q1 , c2 ∈U {0,1, . . . ,2n−1}, s2 ∈U Z∗q2 if Open(sid) already run, abort
t1 := ga1, t2 := X
a, t3 := Y c2 g
s2
2
t1,t2,t3−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
c←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− c ∈U {0,1, . . . ,2n−1}
c1 := c⊕ c2, s1 := (a− c1r) mod q1 c1,c2,s1,s2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ c ?= c1⊕ c2
t1
?
=Uc1 gs11 , t2
?
= ( V
map(m¯) )
c1 X s1 , t3
?
= Y c2 gs22
output: m¯
Fig. 4. C-at: A UC-Secure Commitment Protocol with Atomic Exchanges
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